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Testing the decoy effect in the presence of store brands  
 
Structured abstract 
Purpose: In this paper, the decoy effect is tested in the framework of sales promotion, by 
conducting several experiments to figure out how this decoy effect is influenced by the 
presence or absence of a store brand. 
Design/methodology/approach: Several experiments have been conducted to test the 
validity of the decoy effect and rule out some explanations for the changes in demand that 
take place. The experiments consider three brands (two national brands and one store brand). 
All the brand names and prices employed in the experiment are real.  
Findings: The results indicate that, as expected, the inclusion of a decoy in the choice set 
significantly increases the consumer’s relative preference for the promoted product; however, 
more importantly, the results also show that store brand consumers are more influenced by a 
decoy than national brand consumers. 
Originality/Value: This article presents the first evidence of the decoy effect in the presence 
of store brands. 
Keywords: Store Brands, Promotion, Decoy 
Article Classification: Research Paper 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, store brands have gained big market shares in almost every country in 
Western Europe and are widely offered by European mass retailers (Fall et al., 2013). For 
example, these brands represent about 40% of the total purchases in grocery stores in Spain 
(Nielsen, 2012). The rapid expansion of store brands has generated a vast body of academic 
research (Burt y Davies, 2010; Hyman et al., 2010), and could be explained by the potential 
benefits they have for retailers. Among these benefits, Chen et al. (1999) highlight that store 
brands can be used to attract customers and make more marketing profits from these attracted 
customers as well as from loyal customers. Further, Sayman and Raju (2004) show that 
adding a store brand to the shelves of the retailer increases sales of existing store brands, as 
there is a positive externality across store brands that might be termed as “umbrella brand” 
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effect. Their findings also provide evidence that the retailer may want to design its store brand 
strategy to take advantage of linkages among products. Furthermore, Sudhir and Talukdar 
(2004) show that consumers who buy more store brands in many categories are more 
profitable for the store than consumers who buy relatively more national brands. Thus, selling 
more store brands does not appear to increase consumers’ price sensitivity or cause lower 
revenues or profits. Rather, it allows the store to differentiate itself relative to other stores, 
thereby raising profits. Further, they allow a wide range of product options to be offered to 
meet the differing needs and values of customer groups (Anselmsson and Johansson, 2007). 
Finally, Kremer and Viot (2012) show that store brands have a positive impact on the retailer 
image.  
Store brands, which are created, supervised and sold exclusively by a retailer, compete 
in almost every product category with major national brands as well as international 
manufacturers’ brands (Buck, 1997; Burt, 2000). Thus, an important strategic implication 
derived from the rapid growth of store brands is related to the relationship established with 
manufacturers, especially with manufacturers of national brands. A store brand can be a 
strategic tool used by retailers to generate greater market power in a category (Chintagunta et 
al., 2002; Bonfrer and Chintagunta, 2004), which could ultimately affect the relationship 
between retailers and manufacturers of national brands. In fact, Sayman and Raju (2004) find 
that offering more store brand products reduces the share of leading national brands, thus 
increasing the bargaining power of retailers against manufacturers (Narasimhan and Wilcox, 
1998).  
One of the strategies followed by manufacturers to counter the rise of store brands has 
been increasing promotions. Ailawadi et al. (2001) show that although there are two separate 
and sizeable customer segments that buy one but not the other, there is also a segment that 
usually buys store brands but buys manufacturer brands when they are promoted.  
In this paper, the effect of a promotion run by a manufacturer in order to counter the 
rise of store brands has been analyzed. This effect has been analyzed conducting several 
experiments to figure out how this effect is influenced by the presence or absence of a store 
brand and the presence or absence of a decoy. The decoy effect (or asymmetric dominance 
effect) refers to the addition of a new alternative (a decoy) in the choice set that increases the 
choice for one of the existing alternatives that dominates the new one. This effect assumes 
that consumers tend to change their preference between two options (A and B) when 
presented with a third option (C) that is asymmetrically dominated by one of the initial 
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options (A or B). An option is asymmetrically dominated when it is inferior in all respects to 
one option (say A); however, in comparison to the other option (say B), it is inferior in some 
respects and superior in others.  
The contribution of the paper is that for the first time it is analyzed the effect of a 
promotion in the presence or absence of a store brand when an asymmetrically dominated 
alternative (a decoy) is also included in the choice set. An important issue in marketing is to 
understand how the introduction of a promotion into the market will be reflected in choice 
probabilities or market shares. In this sense, if the promotion is held in the presence of a 
decoy which is dominated by the promotion but not by another alternative in the choice set, 
adding such an alternative can increase the probability of choosing the promoted item that 
dominates it. Further, and also for the first time in the store brand literature, this effect is 
analyzed in the presence or absence of a store brand in the choice set. 
In order to fulfill this objective, the remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. The 
second section reviews previous literature on store brands and the decoy effect. The third 
section presents the experiments conducted to test the decoy effect along with their results. 
Finally, the fourth section summarizes the main conclusions of the paper. 
2. Literature review: Store brands and the decoy effect. 
Since the appearance of store brands, retailers have gone from conceiving it as a tool 
for increasing market share and profitability, to seeing that there are important benefits 
derived from the correct management of these brands (Oubiña et al., 2006). Store brands have 
been implemented in clear competition to manufacturer brands, and the rise of store brands 
has been responded to by manufacturers in a number of different ways (Ailawadi and Keller, 
2004), in an effort to mitigate their impact. Among these strategies, manufacturers have tried 
decreasing costs and cutting prices, increasing promotions, increasing R&D expenditures, 
introducing discount “fighter” brands, or even supplying private label makers. Regarding 
promotions, Ailawadi et al. (2001) show that there are three customer segments: two separate 
and sizeable segments that buy one but not the other and a third segment of value conscious 
consumers who usually buy store brands but buy manufacturer brands when they are 
promoted. The existence of these different segments implies that manufacturers and retailers 
have the opportunity to either avoid each other or to compete head-to-head. If manufacturers 
target the deal-focused segment and retailers target the store-brand focused segment the tug of 
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war between manufacturers and retailers should diminish. However, if manufacturers and 
retailers both target the use-all segment, it can exacerbate competition within the channel. 
Ailawadi et al. (2001) show that manufacturers could partially combat the store brand 
threat through promotions. They can do so with price and convenience oriented messages and 
in-store displays designed to encourage impulsive purchases. In fact, several studies show that 
store brand consumers are more prone to price changes than national brand consumers 
(Richardson et al., 1996), so it is expected that there is also a segment of store brand users that 
is more sensitive to promotions than national brand consumers. Several authors (e.g. Steiner, 
1994; Blattberg and Wisniewski, 1989) have found that price effects are asymmetric as 
manufacturer’s price cuts hurt store brands more than store brand price cuts hurt the national 
brands. 
The widespread use of sales promotions has led to a considerable debate over their 
effectiveness (Kwok and Uncles, 2005). Sales promotions and product enhancements are 
commonly expected to increase a brand's sales when they do not negatively impact its utility 
and cost (Simonson et al., 1994). Some researchers have shown that sales promotions lead to 
real long-run increases in sales and profits (Dhar and Hoch, 1996). However, critics argue that 
sales promotions are ineffective as they make consumers more promotion prone, resulting in 
market share losses in the long run (Ehrenberg et al., 1994). In fact, many marketers and 
academics often view the reliance on sales promotions, especially monetary promotions, as a 
suboptimal consequence of price competition caused by myopic management (Buzzell et al, 
1990). This discrepancy suggests there are other factors at work. Marketers can employ 
several methods to enhance the attractiveness of their offerings, such as adding unique 
product features or offering a free premium. Chandon et al. (2000) state that sales promotions 
are more effective when they provide benefits that are congruent with those of the promoted 
product, while Shampanier et al. (2007) show that people overreact to free products.  
The short and long term effects of these tactics on brand evaluations and sales have 
been studied extensively by marketing researchers and are often discussed in the marketing 
literature (e.g., Blattberg and Neslin, 1990). Generally speaking, it is assumed that enhancing 
a product with features that do not negatively affect other attributes can only help short term 
sales. That is, the purchase probability of consumers who find the promotion attractive will 
increase, whereas the purchase likelihood of other consumers will not be affected. 
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An interesting issue is to understand the way the introduction of a promotion into a 
market is reflected in choice probabilities. A standard model used in such situations is to 
assume that a new offering (the promoted item) will take consumers from others in proportion 
to their original shares. This assumption of proportionality is first incorporated in the Luce 
(1959) model of choice. Several authors show that this assumption of proportionality fails in 
some situations. In this sense, the similarity hypothesis (Tversky, 1972) states that a new 
offering takes disproportionately more share from those similar to it than from dissimilar 
items. The underlying regularity assumption in these models states that the addition of a new 
alternative cannot increase the probability of choosing a member of the original set.  
However, in their seminal paper, Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) evidence that the 
similarity hypothesis and the regularity condition can be consistently violated by the addition 
of an asymmetrically dominated alternative. The relative preference of a target product over a 
competitor can be increased by providing a third alternative (a decoy) that is clearly inferior to 
the target but is not necessarily inferior to the competitor. The decoy effect (or asymmetric 
dominance effect) in marketing is the phenomenon whereby consumers tend to have a 
specific change in preference between two options when presented with a third option that is 
asymmetrically dominated. An option is asymmetrically dominated when it is inferior in all 
respects to one option; but, in comparison to the other option, it is inferior in some respects 
and superior in others. In other words, in terms of specific attributes that determine 
preferability, it is completely dominated by (i.e., inferior to) one option and only partially 
dominated by the other. When the asymmetrically dominated option is present, a higher 
percentage of consumers will prefer the dominating option than when the asymmetrically 
dominated option is absent. The asymmetrically dominated option is therefore a decoy 
serving to increase preference for the dominating option.  
This decoy effect, first identified by Huber et al. (1982), has been replicated in a wide 
variety of choice situations involving both commercial products (for example, Ariely and 
Wallsten, 1995; Dhar and Simonson, 2003; Heath and Chatterjee, 1995; Pettibone and 
Wedell, 2000) as well as non-commercial products such as political candidates (Pan, O'Cuny, 
and Pitts, 1995) or jobs (Highhouse, 1996).  
Decoy effects appear to be robust as they can be found in a variety of product classes 
ranging from restaurants to light bulbs and occur regardless of whether choice sets are 
manipulated between subjects (Heath and Chatterjee, 1995). Further, decoy effects are 
important for both theory and practice as they involve various perceptual and decision making 
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processes. In this paper, the decoy effect is analyzed in the framework of sales promotion. In 
fact, when a promotion is undertaken, the introduction of a decoy into the choice set could 
result in a higher number of consumers shifting their choice to the promoted targeted product 
increasing the effectiveness of the promotion. The decoy is the original product without the 
promotion, which is now asymmetrically dominated by the promoted item.  
There are several factors that could moderate this effect. Specifically, Heath and 
Chatterjee (1995) show an effect of brand quality. In this sense, from their analysis it is 
concluded that decoys reduce shares of lower-quality competitors more than they reduce 
shares of higher-quality competitors. Another factor that could affect the decoy effect is 
examined by Kim et al. (2006), who investigate the role of brand names in the effect of a 
decoy on preference construction. In their analysis, the averaging view and category-based 
processing view are considered to make predictions. In fact, their results predict a general 
reduction in the decoy effect if the real brand names are provided along with attribute 
information about choice alternatives (Kim et al., 2006). On the other hand, the two views 
make different predictions regarding the moderating role of consumer brand knowledge. That 
is, the category-based processing view predicts a significant moderating role of brand 
knowledge (i.e., a significant reduction of decoy effects by presenting real brand names only 
for high brand knowledge conditions), but the averaging view predicts no such role. 
Bronnenberg and Wathieu (1996) study whether national brands may easily attract consumers 
from store brands through promotions, whereas store brands are relatively ineffective in 
attracting consumers from national brands through such means. Their results show that, given 
any two brands, there is an asymmetric promotion effect in favor of the higher quality/higher 
price brand if, and only if, the quality gap between the brands is sufficiently large in 
comparison with the price gap. This result explains why store brand customers overreact to 
promotions compared to national brand consumers.  
3. Testing the phenomenon. 
An online experiment has been conducted to test the validity of the decoy effect and 
rule out some explanations for the changes in demand that take place when a promotion is 
held in the presence or absence of a store brand.  
Participants were asked to suppose they were going to buy one grocery product (one 
liter of chicken broth). All the brand names (two national brands and one store brand) and 
prices employed in the experiment are real. Thus, the following alternatives were considered: 
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One liter of Knorr broth (Unilever), hereafter product K, one liter of a promoted pack of 
Knorr broth, hereafter, product KP, one liter of Gallina Blanca broth (the Spanish market 
leader brand, which belongs to the Agrolimen Group), hereafter, product G, and one liter of 
Carrefour broth (Spanish leader in the hypermarket segment), hereafter called product S and 
which represents the store brand. As the effect of a promotion is analyzed, note that in this 
case the regular pack of Knorr broth (product K) is the decoy, as it is dominated by the 
promoted pack of Knorr broth (product KP). Actually, they both have the same price and 
brand, but the promoted pack contains 10% extra free. This promotion is employed as it is 
expected to be effective and easily understood by consumers. Shampanier et al. (2007) show 
that when people have a choice set with two products, one being free (in this case, an extra 
10% free), they favor the free product as if a zero price not only conveys the idea of no-cost 
but implicitly has extra value.  
The participants were randomly assigned into the three specific experiments 
conducted. After some adjustments to discard incomplete responses, the final sample is 
comprised of 920 participants (294 in the first experiment, 308 in the second experiment and 
318 in the third experiment). Participants were asked to make a hypothetical choice among 
two, three or four alternatives, with each alternative defined by the product (brand) and its 
price (see Table 1). Each experiment involves three conditions which provides a simple 
decision environment and a straightforward test of the effects. The percentage of times the 
target is chosen (which could be a proxy of the market share) with and without the decoy 
present is compared to test the effect of the promotion in the presence or absence of a decoy. 
<Take in Table 1> 
3.1. Experiment 1 
Description. 294 buyers are asked to make a hypothetical choice between a Gallina Blanca 
broth (product G), a promoted Knorr broth (target product KP), and a regular Knorr broth 
(decoy product K). The three conditions in Experiment 1 are as follows (Table 1): i) the first 
is the neutral condition in which individuals choose one of the following two alternatives: 
product K or product G. The alternative of not buying is not considered; ii) the second 
condition implies choosing between the target (product KP) and product G. The purpose of 
Condition 2 is to estimate the effect of the promotion in the absence of a decoy; and iii) the 
third condition is the decoy condition, in which the target (product KP) and the competitor 
(product G) are offered jointly with the decoy (product K). 
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Results. As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 1, under Condition 1, the demand for product 
G (61.2%) is significantly higher than that of product K (38.8%), (t(294)=3.94, p<0.001). This 
mere descriptive result indicates that product G is generally preferred to product K, which is 
consistent with the real market share. Note, however, that the result to be analyzed is how 
these percentages vary when transitioning from Condition 1 to Condition 2, that is, when 
product K is replaced by the promoted product KP. It is observed that the demand for 
promoted product KP broth increases significantly from 38.8% to 51% (t(441)=2.43, p<0.05) 
and the demand for product G falls significantly from 61.2% to 49% (t(441)=2.43, p<0.05). 
This result confirms the effectiveness of the promotion to increase product sales. In the end, 
consumers do not forsake the possibility of obtaining 10% extra product, and therefore they 
change their preferred alternative. 
<Take in Figure 1> 
As for Condition 3, in which the decoy (product K) is also presented, the demand for 
promoted product KP increases from 38.8% to 57.8% (t(441)=3.82, p<0.001), while the 
demand for competitor product G decreases significantly from 61.2% to 42.2% (t(441)=3.82, 
p<0.001). Further the demand for promoted product KP increases from 51% to 57.8% 
(t(294)=1.17; p=0.24) when transitioning from Condition 2 to Condition 3. This result 
confirms that adding an asymmetrically dominated alternative violates the regularity 
condition, as people would change their preference between two options when this new third 
asymmetrically dominated option is introduced, in such a way that the dominating alternative 
(promoted product KP) raises its demand (Huber et al., 1982). In fact, the demand for target 
product KP is higher when the decoy is present (57.8%) than in the absence of the decoy 
(51%). 
3.2. Experiment 2. 
Description. This experiment is exactly the same as Experiment 1 except for the competitor. 
In this case product G is replaced by the store brand alternative (product S). 318 buyers are 
asked to make a hypothetical choice between the alternatives in the choice set. This 
experiment analyzes the decoy effect in the presence of a store brand. The three conditions in 
Experiment 1 are as follows (Table 1): i) the first is the neutral condition in which individuals 
choose between product S (store brand) and product K (national brand); ii) the second 
condition implies choosing between the target (promoted product KP) and product S; and iii) 
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the third condition is the decoy condition, in which the target (promoted product KP) and the 
store brand (product S) are offered jointly with the decoy (product K). 
Results. As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 2, under Condition 1, the demand for product S 
is significantly higher than that of the product K, 60.1%>39.9%, (t(318)=3.67, p<0.001), 
indicating that the store brand product is generally preferred to the national brand product. 
When transitioning from Condition 1 to Condition 2 the results vary. That is, when product K 
is replaced by promoted product KP, it is observed that the demand for product KP increases 
significantly from 39.9% to 56% (t(477)=3.35, p<0.001) and the demand for product S is 
dramatically reduced from 60.1% to 44% (t(477)=3.35, p<0.001). This result again confirms 
that the promotion is an effective tool to increase product sales, as consumers do not forsake 
the possibility of obtaining 10% more product, and thus they change their preferred 
alternative.  
<Take in Figure 2> 
As for Condition 3, in which the decoy (product K) is also presented, the demand for 
the target promoted product KP increases again from 39.9% to 70.4% (t(477)=6.71, p<0.001), 
while the demand for the competitor product S decreases from 60.1% to 29.6% (t(477)=6.71, 
p<0.001). Further the demand for promoted product KP increases from 56% to 70.4% 
(t(318)=2.69; p<0.01) when transitioning form Conditions 2 to Condition 3. This result 
confirms the decoy effect in the presence of a store brand.  
The most interesting result from Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1 is the 
proportional decrease of the market share of product S in Experiment 2 against the 
proportional decrease of the market share of product G in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, the 
demand for product G decreases from 61.2% to 42.2%, implying a 31.0% proportional 
decrease in the presence of the decoy (Condition 3). In Experiment 2, the demand for product 
S decreases from 60.1% to 29.6%, implying a 50.7% proportional decrease in the presence of 
the decoy (Condition 3). Thus, the proportional increase in the demand for the target 
promoted product KP is higher in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. In the presence of the 
store brand the market share of the target product increases from 39.9% to 70.4%, implying 
30.5 points more market share. However, in Experiment 1, when the target product is 
competing against another national brand, demand increases from 38.8% to 57.8%, implying 
20 points more market share. Interestingly, this result suggests that the decoy effect is higher 
in the presence of a store brand.  
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3.3. Experiment 3. 
Description. This experiment is the most realistic of the 3 and is a combination of the 
previous two. It analyzes the decoy effect in the presence of two competitors: a store brand 
and a national brand. In this case, 308 buyers are asked to make a hypothetical choice 
between the alternatives in the choice set. The three conditions in Experiment 3 are as follows 
(Table 1): i) the first is the neutral condition in which individuals choose between the store 
band (product S), the national brand (product G) and the national brand (product K); ii) the 
second condition implies choosing between the target (promoted product KP), the store brand 
(product S) and the national brand (product G); and iii) the third condition is the decoy 
condition, in which the target (promoted product KP), the store brand (product S) and the 
national brand (product G) are offered jointly with the decoy (product K). 
Results. As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 3, under Condition 1, the demand for product 
G is 50.6%, higher than that of the product K (12.7%<50.6% (t(308)=19.6, p<0.001)) and 
product S (36.7%<50.6% (t(308)=4.84, p<0.001)). When transitioning from Condition 1 to 
Condition 2 the results vary. That is, when product K is replaced by promoted product KP, the 
demand for product KP increases significantly from 12.7% to 29.2% (t(462)=3.99, p<0.001). 
Simultaneously, the demand for product S is reduced from 36.7% to 29.9% and the demand 
for product G is reduced from 50.6% to 40.9%. This result again confirms that the promotion 
is an effective tool to increase sales of the product. The increase in the demand of product KP 
(16.5=29.2-12.7) comes both from product S (6.8%) and from product G (9.7%).  
<Take in Figure 3> 
As for Condition 3, in which the decoy (product K) is also presented, demand for the 
target promoted product KP increases drastically from 12.7% to 54.5% (t(462)=9.41, 
p<0.001), while demand for competitor product G decreases from 50.6% to 29.9% 
(t(462)=4.44, p<0.001) and demand for product S decreases from 36.7% to 15.6% 
(t(462)=4.34, p<0.001). Further the demand for promoted product KP increases from 29.2% 
to 54.5% (t(308)=4.65; p<0.001) when transitioning from Condition 2 to Condition 3. This 
result again confirms the presence of a decoy effect, as adding an asymmetrically dominated 
alternative raises demand for the dominating alternative (promoted product KP). As in 
Condition 2, the increase in demand for promoted product KP (41.8=54.5-12.7) comes both 
from store brand consumers (21.1) and from product G (20.7). A more interesting result is 
that the proportional decrease in demand for product S (store brand) is higher (57.5%) than 
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the proportional decrease of demand for product G (national brand) (41%), which shows  that 
store brand buyers are more influenced than national brand buyers by promotions when a 
decoy is also included in the choice set.  
<Take in Table 2> 
4. Conclusions. 
The rise of store brands is a challenge for national brand managers. Face-to-face competition 
on retail shelves adds complexity to the decision process; nevertheless, this challenge also 
allows managers to use the interrelationships among the decisions to maximize sales and 
promotions. This article analyzes the decoy effect when a promotion is established in the 
presence or absence of a store brand in the choice set. Stemming from Huber et al’s. (1982) 
model, we adapt and apply it to a three-component context, and carry out three experiments. 
As several studies have shown that promotions of national brands yield more effect than those 
of store brands (e.g., Blattberg and Wisniewski, 1989) the participants are asked to make a 
hypothetical choice between three products: one store brand and two national brands. 
Experiments 1 and 2 show evidences of the decoy effect when the competitor is a 
national brand and a store brand, respectively. The results suggest that store brand consumers 
are more influenced by promotions than national brand consumers. Further, the decoy effect 
is higher in the presence of a store brand competitor than for a national brand competitor. The 
alternatives in Experiment 3 represent the real alternatives consumers have when choosing a 
product, having the possibility of buying the store brand or one of two national brands. This 
inclusion affords realism to the experiment because it introduces brand commitment when 
analyzing the asymmetric dominance effect. The results suggest that store brand consumers 
are more likely to change their selection in order to benefit from a promotion than national 
brand consumers. This result is consistent with and corroborates the results of previous 
experiments. 
The results of this article show that the decoy effect is not only confined to national 
brands (as several authors show) but also applies to store brands, even with a multi-alternative 
context. Further, the results have important managerial implications, mainly in the realm of 
sales promotion policies. Although many marketers and academics often view the reliance on 
sales promotions, especially monetary promotions, as a suboptimal consequence of price 
competition caused by myopic management (Buzzell et al, 1990), this paper shows that, in the 
short run, they are a reliable method of attracting store brand consumers to national brands. 
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The existence of multiple types of consumer benefits provides a stepping stone for a benefit 
congruency framework, which argues that a sales promotion’s effectiveness is determined by 
the congruency between its benefits and those of the promoted product (Chandon et al., 
2000). Further, if a decoy is included when the promotion is held, the effectiveness of the 
promotion is even higher.  
Finally, the following important avenues for further research are highlighted: i) 
applications to other product categories would shed light onto common (or different) reactions 
between brands; ii) in the experimental research, a three-component context has been 
considered, including one store brand and two national brands. In this case the store brand is 
the cheapest alternative, and store brand consumers appear to be the most influenced by a 
promotion. Nowadays, retailers offer several store brands for the same product category in 
order to segment the market. Thus, more research is needed to analyze this effect.  
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Figure 1. Results of Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 3. 
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Table 1. Conditions in the experiments. 
 
Product S 
(Carrefour) 
(Store Brand 
Competitor) 
Product G 
(Gallina Blanca) 
(National Brand 
Competitor) 
Product K 
(Knorr) 
(Decoy) 
Product KP 
(Promoted 
Knorr) 
(Target) 
Experiment 1 
Condition 1 - Price 1.55€ Price 1.65€ - 
Condition 2 - Price 1.55€ - Price 1.65 +10% Extra Free 
Condition 3 - Price 1.55€ Price 1.65€ (Decoy) 
Price 1.65 
+10% Extra Free 
Experiment 2 
Condition 1 Price 1.15€ - Price 1.65€ - 
Condition 2 Price 1.15€ - - Price 1.65 +10% Extra Free 
Condition 3 Price 1.15€ - Price 1.65€ (Decoy) 
Price 1.65 
+10% Extra Free 
Experiment 3 
Condition 1 Price 1.15€ Price 1.55€ Price 1.65€ - 
Condition 2 Price 1.15€ Price 1.55€ - Price 1.65 +10% Extra Free 
Condition 3 Price 1.15€ Price 1.55€ Price 1.65€ (Decoy) 
Price 1.65 
+10% Extra Free 
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Table 2. Summary of the results in the experiments. 
 
Product S 
(Carrefour) 
(Store Brand 
Competitor) 
Product G 
(Gallina Blanca) 
(National Brand 
Competitor) 
Product K 
(Knorr) 
(Decoy) 
Product KP 
(Promoted 
Knorr) 
(Target) 
Experiment 1 
Condition 1 - 61.2 31.8 - 
Condition 2 - 49 - 51 
Condition 3 - 42.2 0 57.8 
Experiment 2 
Condition 1 60.1 - 39.9 - 
Condition 2 44 - - 56 
Condition 3 29.6 - 0 70.4 
Experiment 3 
Condition 1 36.7 50.6 12.7 - 
Condition 2 29.9 40.9 - 29.2 
Condition 3 15.6 29.9 0 54.5 
 
 
 
